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A large portion of the rise in the education premium can be ex-
plained by a signaling theory of education which predicts that in the fu-
ture, increases in the education level of the workforce will actually cause
the education premium to rise, simply because diﬀerent workers are be-
ing labeled as “highly educated”. This prediction is supported by past
behavior of the high school education premium. It runs counter to the
view that increases in the relative supply of high education workers will
always lower education’s relative price. Suppose education does not af-
fect an individual’s productivity, but acts only as a signal of it because
individuals select education based on their productivity, and wages are
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1determined by productivity. It is shown that this implies additional ed-
ucation in the economy would not change the wage distribution. The
education premium, or relative price of highly educated workers, is the
r a t i oo fm e a nh i g he d u c a t i o nw a g e st om e a nl o we d u c a t i o nw a g e s .I fa l l
workers gained more education, it would mean the “bar” (or productivity
minimum) for a given level of education was being lowered. For example,
suppose “highly educated” referred to a college education. If there were
few college grads, lowering the bar (the most productive non-college grads
becoming college grads) would reduce mean college wages signiﬁcantly by
adding lower productivity workers. Because there would be many non-
college grads vs. college grads, a drop in the bar would cause a smaller fall
in the mean non-college graduate wage by removing the most productive
workers. It is shown that this implies the education premium would fall.
However, if the bar was low enough so that there were many college grads
and few non-college grads, the reverse would happen and further declines
in the bar would cause education’s relative price to rise. This eﬀect would
not be due to real changes, but to changes in labeling. To measure how
large this eﬀect could have been, simulations were done to create coun-
terfactual education premiums for three deﬁnitions of “highly educated”:
(1) those with a college degree; (2) those with some college education;
(3) those with a high school education. Premiums were created for the
Census years 1950-2000 that hold the wage distribution the same as the
previous decade, but allow the distribution of education across wage ranks
to be the from the present year. These show what the premiums would
have been if wages didn’t change but education levels changed as in the
2data. The simulations for (1) and (2) perform as expected: the simulated
premiums fall when there are more high education individuals, and this
can explain some or all of the observed changes in the education premium
between the past six decades of census data. However, (3) also acts as the
model predicts: because this deﬁnition has many more highly educated
individuals, further increases in the supply of highly educated individuals
lower the counterfactual premium. Thus, this model predicts that as the
number of college graduates rises, additional grads will eventually cause
the premium to increase.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Much of the movement in the education premium over that last six decades
can be explained by a signaling theory of education which predicts that in the
future, increases in the education level of the workforce will actually cause the
education premium to rise, simply because diﬀerent workers are being labeled
as “highly educated”. This prediction is supported by the past behavior of the
high school education premium. It runs counter to the view that an increase
in the relative supply of high education workers will always lower education’s
relative price.
Consider if education was purely signaling, and had no eﬀect on productivity,
as an extreme case. This is a model similar to Stiglitz (1975) and Riley (1979).
Suppose employers know the distribution of productivity in the economy, and
oﬀer each worker a wage that the employers believe equals the worker’s produc-
3tivity. Also, more productive workers are better at obtaining education, and
employers know this. Therefore, more productive workers would obtain more
education to diﬀerentiate themselves and get a higher wage oﬀer. In equilib-
rium, the education rank of an individual would equal their productivity rank,
a n de m p l o y e r sw o u l do ﬀer a wage equal to productivity.
The returns to education are typically measured by the education premium,
deﬁned as the ratio of the average high education wage to the average low
education wage, as in Katz & Murphy (1992).1 Any meaningful measure of the
gains to education would have to be equivalent such a ratio,2 unless the diﬀerence
in wages was used. However, due to inﬂation and labor productivity growth, the
diﬀerence isn’t as useful. High(low) education workers have more(less) education
than a certain level, which will be called the "bar" for education. What is
typically considered the "bar" has varied over time, but is usually considered to
be a 4 year college education, as in Katz & Autor (1999).
Now suppose each individual increased their education level from the pre-
vious equilibrium. Every education rank would remain the same. Thus every
worker would have the same wage as before. However, some workers who were
previously too low in productivity/education to be over the bar are now counted
as highly educated. This would lower both the average high education wage,
since a worker was added who’s wage is lower than the others, and the average
1Katz & Murphy (1992) use a more complex weighting method to compute high and low
education wages.
2The case of many education catagories can be applied simply by having multiple wage
ratios, or premia.
4low education wage, since the highest . The eﬀect on the education premium
would depend on how many workers were currently highly educated. If there
were very few high types, the addition of a few lower productivity workers would
signiﬁcantly lower the average high wage, while the average low wage would fall
only slightly because there would be many of them. The premium would fall.
Thus it would seem as if high and low skilled workers were diﬀerent inputs,
whose relative prices fall when relative supplies rise, as in Murphy & Welch
(1992) and Katz & Murphy (1992).
But suppose education levels continued to rise and there were more and more
highly educated workers, as is documented in the latter studies, among others.
The eﬀect on the premium would reverse, since the average high wage would
only fall slightly from the addition of a few more marginal workers, while the
average low wage would fall signiﬁcantly. At this point, an increased relative
supply of education causes its relative price to rise, unlike normal inputs in
production. This entire eﬀect is not due to any real wage changes, but only to
how relative wages are deﬁned.
Many studies, including the latter two, have noted the rising education pre-
mium, and concluded that demand for highly educated workers is rising. Under
this hypothesis, additional education is advocated to compensate for the addi-
tional demand. However, if education does not aﬀect productivity as explained
above, and if the economy already has a certain number of high education work-
ers, this will actually cause the premium to rise even more so.
Section 2 presents a signaling model similar to Stiglitz (1975), Riley (1979),
5and others, in which there is a continuum of worker types, and employers set
wages according to the rule that a worker’s wage rank in the economy is set
equal to their education rank. The eﬀects of additional education are described
for the wage distribution of the 2000 census, using a simpliﬁcation where all
high education workers earn above all low education workers, as an illustration.
In section 3, census data from 1940-2000 is used to calculate the magnitude of
the eﬀects described above. To do this, the education premium is calculated for
two counterfactual cases. In one case, the wage distribution from the previous
period is held constant but the distribution of education conditional on wage
rank is taken from the current period. The probability of education conditional
on wage rank indicates which individuals are attaining education. This measures
how the premium would have changed if the wage distribution had not, and so
measures the "pure signaling" eﬀect — the case where education has no eﬀect on
wages. The other case holds the conditional distribution of education constant,
and allows the wage distribution to change, measuring the "pure wage" eﬀect.
Since it has been documented that the wage distribution has changed in variance
by Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce (1993), Card & DiNardo (2002), and others, the
"wage" eﬀect is a measure of how much the premium would have changed for
reasons other than education changes. Mean wages for each education level are
also calculated for the "pure signaling" case in order to determine which changes
in the education distribution are driving the results.
A l lo ft h i si sr e p e a t e df o rd i ﬀerent deﬁnitions of "highly educated": (1)
college graduates; (2) those with some college; (3) high school only graduates.
6These three deﬁnitions diﬀer in a key aspect, the percentage of the sample
deﬁned as "highly educated," with 1-3 going from least to greatest. This gives
a much broader range for the data.
The results show that in every decade the pure signaling eﬀect is signiﬁcant,
and sometimes larger than the wage eﬀect. First consider the results for deﬁ-
nition (1), college grads. In the 40s, the premium falls due both to the wage
eﬀect and because many low wage workers gained education, perhaps due to
the GI bill. In the 50s and 60s, the premium rose due to both eﬀects, where
high wage workers attained education in larger numbers, perhaps as a return
to the normal trend after the shock of the 40s. In the 70s, the premium falls
entirely because of the signaling eﬀect, where mostly marginal workers attained
education in large numbers. The 80s were similar to the 50s and 60s, though the
wage eﬀect was more pronounced. The 90s had the premium rise due mostly to
the wage eﬀect. Over the entire period, 1940-2000, the signaling eﬀect would
have caused the premium to fall, while changes in the wage distribution domi-
nated and caused the premium to rise. This is consistent with results in Katz
& Murphy (1992) and Murphy & Welch (1992) that conclude that additional
education supply would have caused the premium to fall, but other factors3
overcame that eﬀect. This is also consistent with the prediction that when
there are few enough high educated workers, the signaling eﬀect will cause the
premium to fall, even though particular decades were dominated by the eﬀects
of wars and the later adjustments. Deﬁnition (2), for some college education,
3They call the other factors demand changes.
7acts mostly like deﬁnition (1).
Deﬁnition (3) however, acts diﬀerently. In every decade except the 40s and
70s, and for the whole period, the signaling eﬀect causes the premium to rise.
In the 40s and 70s, the signaling premium falls because many low wage workers
gained education, for the same reasons as above. Because the percentage of
workers who are "highly educated" under this deﬁnition is so much higher, it
is consistent with the prediction that eventually additional education will cause
the premium to rise.
Section 4 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Equilibrium
This model provides an example of how a signaling equilibrium could exist where
each worker’s wage rank is equal to their education rank, and changes in the
population’s education would not alter the wage distribution.
Suppose there is a continuum of workers indexed by productivity  ∼ (),
where () is the c.d.f. of . Each worker can produce education, ,f o r
themselves by allocating the fraction of time allocated to education, , according
to
 =  () .( 1 )
More productive workers can more easily attain a given education level, so that
 ()  ()  ()  0 .( 2 )
8Workers choose the amount of time allocated for education to maximize wages
as a function of education level,  (), net of the time spent gaining education
max
 (1 − ) ()=m a x
 (1 − ) [ ()] .( 3 )
Employers know (). Suppose employers oﬀer wages by setting the worker’s
wage rank equal to their education rank. Let 	() denote the c.d.f. of education
in the economy. Then employers would oﬀer wages such that
 ()=−1 (	()) ,( 4 )
or, alternatively,
	()=( ()) .( 5 )
Conjecture 1 There exists an equilibrium such that workers choose  to max-
imize wages net of time costs,
∗ =a r gm a x
 (1 − ) ()=a r gm a x
 (1 − ) [ ()] , (6)
ﬁrms oﬀer each worker a wage equal to productivity,
 [ (∗)] =  for all  ,
and each worker’s education rank is equal to wage rank,
	()=( ()) for all  . (7)
***Proof Pending***
92.2 The Eﬀects of Uniform Education Gains on the Edu-
cation Premium
In order to illustrate the eﬀects of education supply on the premium when
education does not aﬀect the wage distribution, consider a simple example.
Suppose everyone with education above 0 was labeled as having high education,
and everyone with education below 0 was labeled as having low education. Let

0 ≡  (0), so that everyone with wage-productivity greater than 
0 was
labeled as highly educated. As everyone gains more education, 
0 will fall. The
question is, what happens to the education premium as 
0 falls?
Let 
 ∼  (
).L e t (
0) and  (
0) denote the mean wage and num-
ber of highly educated workers as a function of 
0,a n d (
0) and  (
0)




























Then the education premium as a function of 
0 is
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0 is high, so that  is high and  is low. Then the ﬁrst term
in the parentheses will tend to be small and the second term will tend to be
10large, making the derivative tend to be positive. The reverse will be true when














0  0 .
***Proof Pending***
Figure 1 below plots the education premium as a function of the wage bar,

0, for the 2000 Census.4 This is simply the ratio of the mean of all wages above
the bar to the mean of all wages below the bar in the 2000 sample. Of course,
this is a simpliﬁcation of the actual premium, since not every worker with high
education will earn more than every worker with low education. As the wage bar
falls from its highest level, the premium falls and then rises, just as predicted.
The lowest point of the premium is approximately reached at 
0 =1 3 2 3,w h i c h
is close to the mean wage for the whole population, $147.35. At this point,
30.53% of the population is labeled "highly educated." About 31.18% of the 2000
Census had a college education or more, according to calculations in section III.
Therefore, in 2000 the economy was around the point at which further increases
in college education would cause the college premium to rise, if everyone gained
education uniformly and education had no eﬀect on the wage distribution.
4See section III for more about the data.
113 Simulation
The purpose of this section is to determine if the changes over time in the
education premium and other wage statistics are consistent with the model,
and if so, how much education levels changing over a ﬁxed wage distribution
can explain those statistics.
To do this, counterfactual statistics are created for the cases in which either
the wage distribution does not change from one period to the next, or the
distribution of education over wage ranks doesn’t change. Since the model
implies education would not aﬀect the wage distribution, the distribution of
12wages and the distribution of education over wage ranks can be considered
separately. One set of counterfactual statistics uses the previous period’s wage
distribution and the current period’s education distribution, to determine what
would have happened if the wage distribution didn’t change at all (the "pure
signaling" premium). The other uses current wages and the previous education
distribution to determine what would have happened if education levels didn’t
change (the "wage changing" premium). If the pure signaling premium is close
to the actual premium, it can explain much of the change in the premium, and
likewise for the "wage changing" premium.
Let the distribution of wages in period  be  (
), and an individual’s
wage rank in period  be given by  =  (
). Let individuals be indexed by
wage rank , and the education level be denoted by 	
 ∈  for high and
low education for the individual with wage rank  in period .L e t t h e t o t a l
p o p u l a t i o ni np e r i o d be denoted as  = 
 + 
 , for the highest rank in
period . Thus the probability of an individual with wage rank  being highly
educated in period  is  (	
 = ).











 () ,( 1 1 )























 () .( 1 3 )
13In the case  where education is pure signaling, the counterfactual mean














so that the wage distribution,  (
), is the same as in the previous period ,
but the distribution of education across wage ranks, 1(	
 = ),i sf r o mt h e



















Other studies, including Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce (1993) and Card & Di-
Nardo (2002), have shown that for many years the wage distribution has changed.
In order to determine how much of the changes in the education premium were
due to changes in the wage distribution, as opposed to changes in the education
distribution, counterfactual premiums are calculated for the case where the wage






























Above, it was discussed what the eﬀects on the premium would be if all
workers gained more education. However, in the data, increases in education
do not always occur evenly across all wage ranks. Also, wages are not perfectly
14correlated with education: some very high wage workers can have low education,
and vice versa. To ﬁgure out how this aﬀects the premium, ﬁrst consider workers
in the middle of the wage distribution, those with wages inbetween the mean
high and low education wages. If more of them move from being low educated
to high educated, both high and low mean wages will fall, and the premium will
a c ti nt h em a n n e rd e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o nI I .A tl o wq u a n t i t i e so fh i g he d u c a t e d
workers the premium will tend to fall, but at high levels it will tend to rise. But
if workers who earned more than the mean high wage moved from being low to
high educated, the mean hig hw a g ew o u l dr i s e ,t h em e a nl o ww a g ew o u l df a l l ,
a n dt h ep r e m i u mw o u l dr i s e . I fw o r k e r sw h oe a r n e dl e s st h a nt h em e a nl o w
wage became highly educated, mean low education wages would rise, mean high
education wages would fall, and the premium would fall.
As more and more people gain education, the deﬁnition of high education
changes. The deﬁnition of "highly educated" most common in the current lit-
erature is a college graduate, but the deﬁnition more common early in the 20th
c e n t u r ya n db e f o r e ,a si sn o t e di nG o l d i n&K a t z( 1 9 9 5 ) ,w a sah i g hs c h o o lg r a d -
uate. Each deﬁnition uses a diﬀerent 
0 "bar," but in each case the number of
highly educated individuals tends to rise over time (the "bar" falls). Therefore,
the deﬁnition of high school graduate in this model would be a good prediction
of the college graduate deﬁnition in a future where the number of college grad-
uates had grown to the current level of high school graduates. Three diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of "highly educated" were used here in order to have a broader range
of education quantities: (1) those with a college degree or more education; (2)
15those with at least two years of college; (3) those with at least a high school
education.
In general, the model predicts that in the pure signaling case under deﬁn-




 w o u l dt e n dt of a l lo v e rt i m ea sw o r k e r sg a i n
more education, with mean high education wages falling more than mean low
education wages, so that the counterfactual pure signaling premium would fall.





 would still fall, 

 should fall more than 

 ,
and the counterfactual premium should rise. Deﬁnition (2) could act like ei-
ther, depending on how many more high educated workers there were under
this deﬁnition. This eﬀect should explain a signiﬁcant amount of the changes in
the actual premiums, so that the counterfactual premiums should not be close
to the actual premium in the previous period, but closer to the current actual
premium.
U.S. census data from 1940-2000 from the IPUMS was used.5 Incomes that
were at the year’s topcode were multiplied by 1.4.6 All workers who reported
less than 35 hours worked per week and/or less than 40 weeks per year were
excluded. Also, workers who earned less than the minimum hourly wage were
assumed to be misreported and excluded. While the ﬁrst adjustment did not
seem to alter the results signiﬁcantly, the two exclusions do.7
5Data was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series website, from the
Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota.
6This is similar to Katz & Murphy (1992) and Card and DiNardo (2002).
7The further below the minimum wage an individual is, the more likely they are to have
attended college. This is interpreted to mean that the further below the minimum wage, the
16For each census year, a sample of individuals was ranked according to hourly
wage. Each individual was assigned a binary variable, 1 or 0,f o r1(	
 = ).
Two vectors were created for each census year, one for 1(	
 = ) and one vector
of wages for 
−1
 (). The vectors were multiplied element by element and aver-
aged to obtain the actual mean wages which were then divided to obtain actual
education premiums. For the pure signaling counterfactuals, the 1(	
 = )
for the current year and 
−1
 () wage vector for the previous census year was
used, and vice versa for the wage counterfactuals. Also, counterfactuals were
calculated using 1940 and 2000, to cover the whole period. The samples of in-
dividuals were randomly selected to be equal in number to the smaller adjacent
census year, so that the vectors of comparison years would be of equal length
even though IPUMS census samples have diﬀering numbers of observations in
diﬀerent years. Therefore there is a slight randomness to the results. To min-
imize this, each statistic that uses two diﬀerent census years is averaged over
3000 trials. The remaining variation does not change any of the qualitative
results.
more reporting errors there are of people who should have been somewhere else in the wage
spectrum.
17Table 1: Statistics and Counterfactual Statistics Using College
Educated as the Deﬁnition of Highly Educated
Year
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1940-2000
Education Premium 1.55459 1.395 1.5334 1.6122 1.433 1.6552 1.8019
"signaling" Premium 1.4704 1.4873 1.5676 1.4216 1.5085 1.6645 1.5114
"Wage" Premium 1.4625 1.4416 1.5723 1.6283 1.5616 1.7876 1.9021
Mean High wage,  1.13991 2.1248 3.7756 6.2005 10.8106 19.4398 28.8356
Mean Low wage,  0.73326 1.5231 2.4622 3.8460 7.5438 11.7448 16.0032
"signaling" High Wage
 1.1226 2.2384 3.7764 5.4413 11.0602 19.2526 1.0644
"signaling" Low Wage
 .7635 1.5050 2.4091 3.8276 7.3318 11.5667 .7042
%H i g h l yE d u c a t e d .0951 .1154 .1500 .2300 .2734 .3118
Std. Dev. of Log Wages .4668 .3812 .4358 .4531 .4742 .575 .5920
The results in Table 1 tend to conﬁrm the model’s predictions, with two im-
portant irregularities. For the entire period statistics, in the 1940-2000 column,
the pure signaling eﬀect would have caused the premium to fall, while the pure
wage eﬀect caused it to rise. The latter would be due to the increased variance
in the wage distribution as shown in the standard deviation of log wages. This
is consistent with the model’s predictions when the number of highly educated
is low, or less than 32% here. Both the pure signaling high and low mean wages
fell, with the high wage falling more. Other studies, such as Katz & Murphy
(1992), have also shown that an additional supply of college grads would have
caused the premium to fall, but other factors caused the premium to rise (they
18call it a demand increase). Here, however, this eﬀect can explained without the
need for any real eﬀects of education.
Decade by decade changes are more complicated. In the 1940s, the premium
falls, due both to the signaling and wage eﬀe c t s . T h ew a g ee ﬀect can be ex-
plained by the fall in wage variance. As for the signaling eﬀect, refer to ﬁgure
2 below. It displays the percentage of individuals in the census who are college
educated for a given wage percentile (rank) for each census year, or  (	
 = )
for  being college educated.
From ﬁgure ??, in 1950, there were more low wage earners, while there
19was virtually no change for high wage earners. The counterfactual signaling
mean college wage fell (it was lower than the actual 1940 mean college wage),
while the counterfactual mean high school wage rose (it was higher than the
actual 1940 mean high school wage), meaning more low wage earners gained
a college education than high wage earners. In other words, the mean college
wage fell and the mean high school wage rose because many low wage earners
shifted to the college educated group. This counterintuitive shift may have been
due to WWII and the GI bill.8
In the 1950s, there is an adjustment back to a more "normal" trend of
education gain. The education premium rose, due to both eﬀects, and the wage
variance rose. From ﬁgure 2 it can be seen that high wage earners tended to
gain more college education. This can also be seen in the rise in the signaling
college wage above the 1950 actual college wage and the fall in the signaling
high school wage from the 1950 actual wage. Thus, part of the premium rise is
due simply to the fact that higher earning people were included in the college
"label". The 1960s are similar to the 1950s.
The 1970s resemble the 40s more than the 50s and 60s. However, the wage
premium in 1980 is higher than the actual 1970 premium, consistent with the
increase in wage variance. The 1980 signaling premium is lower than the actual
1980 premium, making it the sole cause of the fall in the premium. Figure 2
shows a very large increase in the number of low and middle wage earners gaining
8The irregularities of the 1940s wage and educational changes and the eﬀects of the war
are studied in Goldin & Katz (1992).
20a college education, and both the signaling college and high school mean wages
were below their previous actual levels. This could be due to the Vietnam War.
The signaling wage changes imply that the model’s predicted eﬀects of education
gains dominated: the signaling eﬀe c tc a u s e db o t hm e a nw a g e st of a l lb u tt h e
low education wage was aﬀected more than the high wage. This is despite the
fact that low wage earners gained relatively more education. The 80s and 90s
act similarly to the 50s and 60s, perhaps as an adjustment to the 70s just as
the 50s and 60s adjusted to the 40s.
In summary, although there were shocks in the 40s and 70s that disrupted
the usual trends, the counterfactual premiums and wages acted over the entire
period as the model would predict.
21Table 2: Statistics and Counterfactuals Using Some College
Education as the Deﬁnition of Highly Educated
Year
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1940-2000
Education Premium 1.46509 1.3283 1.4550 1.5153 1.3569 1.5579 1.6960
"signaling" Premium 1.3872 1.4081 1.4784 1.3460 1.4361 1.5859 1.4572
"Wage" Premium 1.3895 1.3677 1.4877 1.5296 1.4603 1.6631 1.7549
Mean high wage,  1.05495 1.9961 3.5119 5.6850 9.9914 18.0201 26.6377
Mean Low wage,  .72006 1.5028 2.4137 3.7518 7.3636 11.5671 15.7066
"signaling" High Wage
 1.0430 2.0840 3.4791 5.0345 10.3894 18.0045 1.0077
"signaling" Low Wage
 0.7519 1.4800 2.3534 3.7403 7.2344 11.3527 .6915
%H i g h l yE d u c a t e d .1571 .1822 .2314 .3545 .3537 .3913 .3913
Std. Dev. of Log Wages .4668 .3812 .4358 .4531 .4742 .5551 .5920
22Deﬁnition (2) in table 2, those with some college as highly educated, acts
almost the same as the college grads deﬁnition. The only exception is for the
1960s, where the signaling mean high education wage is lower than the actual
1950 mean wage. The fact that the 1970 signaling premium is also lower than
the 1960 real premium is probably due an adjustment to the 40s, just as before,
which made the signaling high wage fall by less than it normally would have.
The reason the some college deﬁnition works similarly to the college deﬁnition
is probably due to the fact that the some college deﬁnition is not more inclusive,
with still only 39.13% of people highly educated in 2000 under this deﬁnition.
23Table 3: Statistics and Counterfactuals Using High School
Educated as the Deﬁnition of Highly Educated
Year
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1940-2000
Education Premium 1.19538 1.14824 1.2263 1.25084 1.20421 1.43468 1.57168
"signaling" Premium 1.1750 1.1996 1.2338 1.1927 1.3459 1.5130 1.4187
"Wage" Premium 1.1673 1.1682 1.2426 1.2626 1.2553 1.4921 1.3519
Mean high wage,  .84788 1.64744 2.77345 4.34577 8.15737 13.8286 20.0793
Mean Low wage,  .70930 1.43475 2.26097 3.47426 6.78617 9.63883 12.8008
"signaling" High Wage
 0.8227 1.6709 2.7066 4.1812 8.2233 13.8952 0.7979
"signaling"Low Wage
 0.7002 1.3928 2.1938 3.5057 6.1097 9.1837 0.5625
%H i g h l yE d u c a t e d 0.4013 0.4792 0.5338 0.6641 0.8103 0.8674 0.8890
Std. Dev. of Log Wages .4668 .3812 .4358 .4531 .4742 .5551 .5920
24For deﬁnition (3) in table 3, where high school graduates are considered
highly educated, the data is consistent with the model’s predictions for high
numbers of highly educated workers. The premium rises due to the wage eﬀect,
a st h ew a g ev a r i a n c er i s e s . B u tt h ep r e m i u ma l s or i s e sd u et ot h es i g n a l i n g
eﬀect, as the signaling premium for 1940-2000 is higher than the 1940 actual
premium. Both high and low education signaling mean wages fell from the 1940
actual levels, with the low mean wage falling further.
The 40s and 50s act similarly for the high school deﬁnition as for the college
deﬁnition. The signaling eﬀect lowered the premium in the 40s, and so did the
25wage eﬀect as the wage variance fell. The signaling mean low education wage
rose from the 1940 actual wage and the signaling mean high education wage
fell from the 1940 actual wage. As can be seen in ﬁgure 4, low wage workers
again attained relatively more education. The 50s acted as an adjustment, just
as for the college deﬁnition. The 60s, however, see the signaling eﬀect increase
the premium, despite the fact that the signaling mean high education in 1970
wage fell from the 1960 actual wage. In that sense, the 60s acted as the model
would predict when there are many highly educated workers. The premium falls
over the 70s due entirely to the signaling eﬀect, because once again low wage
workers greatly increase in education, as can be seen in ﬁgure 4, and because
the signaling mean high wage fell from the 1970 actual wage and mean low wage
rose from the 1970 actual wage. This eﬀect overcame the wage eﬀect and the
increase in the wage variance. The 80s and 90s again can be interpreted as in
the college deﬁnition, as an adjustment to the changes of the 70s.
In summary, additional high school graduates tended to make the education
premium rise as predicted, though the rise was bumpy due to the shocks of the
40s and 70s.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In an economy where education does not aﬀect productivity and employers oﬀers
wages to equate wage rank and education rank, rising education by all workers
will at ﬁrst cause the education premium to fall, and then rise. The eﬀects
26of a changing education distribution across wages can be seen to act this way
in the 1940-2000 census years. If these trends continue, this eﬀect could cause
the relative price of a college education to actally rise with additional relative
supply soon, as the percent of workers with a college education is close to what
the percent of workers with a high school education was over the support of
the census data. This could provide a testable implication of the signaling
hypothesis: if the college education premium is seen to rise with additional
supply, it would support the signaling model.
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